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ABSTRACT. Beyond grand constitutional moments such as the New Deal and the civil rights
era, the American people also remove other, less prominent issues from majoritarian politics.
This process of petit popular constitutionalism resolves numerous important issues of
government structure and is crucial for vulnerable groups seeking to implement and expand
gains they made during grand constitutional moments.
In our two-party system, this gives groups three options. They may join one party's core
constituency, attempt to position themselves as a swing constituency, or seek to establish their
concerns as moral imperatives outside of partisan debate with the leadership of a few
mainstream politicians of each party. Exerting influence as a core constituency or swing group
requires coherence, communication, and group identity that many sets of vulnerable people lack.
The alternative petit constitutional route typically requires paring back a group's objectives to
essential aims that can win wide acceptance as moral imperatives across the political spectrum.
Since the 196os, policy for means-tested public benefit programs has been torn between a
partisan "welfare rights" track and a petit constitutional "anti-poverty" theme. The 1996 welfare
law represented the final defeat of welfare rights in partisan politics. This leaves low-income
people dependent on petit constitutionalism, following the same path that death penalty
abolitionists and others took after being disowned by one or the other political party.
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INTRODUCTION
Bruce Ackerman's recent work provides a compelling account of the
constitutional development of civil rights law in the two decades following
Brown v. Board ofEducation,' centered on the three great civil rights statutes of
the 1960s.2 In the process, he deals a devastating blow to the conventional, if
ahistorical, view that constitutional law only involves manipulations of our
founding document and the modest number of formal amendments added
since.
As important as it is, however, Professor Ackerman's account is incomplete
in two crucial respects. First, it provides little explanation of how important
issues such as civil rights are handled between constitutional moments. As he
notes, constitutional moments are exceedingly rare. After grand constitutional
conflicts come to an end, some other form of lawmaking is required to
implement their outcomes and to address issues that were neglected. Text-
dependent constitutional theorists have at least a superficially coherent
explanation of this process: politicians do what they will and courts strike
down attempts to transgress the document. Shifting the focus away from
judicial review provides a richer, more inclusive, and more accurate account of
constitutional formation in this country. But it also requires a more
sophisticated explanation of how constitutionalism operates during the
prolonged "down time." Institutional checking, through the separation of
powers' and federalism, 4 provides a vehicle for implementing structural
constitutional norms, such as those that arose out of the New Deal
constitutional moment. This process is much less well understood, however,
with respect to counter-majoritarian constitutional norms such as civil liberties
and civil rights. To fulfill the promise of the constitutional moment Professor
Ackerman describes in his recent work, we must understand how civil rights
can advance both during periods of relatively brief mass engagement and
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTs REVOLUTION (2014).
3. See, e.g., Jon Michaels, The Rise and Fall ofAdministrative Separation ofPowers, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (finding that a new separation of powers,
between political appointees, civil servants, and civil society, has constrained the
administrative state in much the way that rivalries between the President, the courts, and
Congress operate in the constitutional order).
4. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009) (finding that the federal government's need of the states' help to implement its
program empowers states to check federal power).
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during periods with none at all, when "ordinary citizens return to the sidelines,
focusing more emphatically on the pursuit of private happiness."s
Second, Professor Ackerman, like most text-based constitutional theorists,
largely limits his focus to grand constitutionalism. This is certainly
understandable. Not all provisions of the U.S. Constitution are of equal
importance: the Commerce Clause obviously affects our political lives far more
than the Marque and Reprisal Clause.' And the principles laid down during
the Civil Rights Revolution are of far greater importance than most other
popular decisions, even transformative ones. Yet it would be a serious mistake
to dichotomize political life between grand constitutional pronouncements on
the most important issues facing the nation and simple majoritarian
disposition of everything else. We prevent majoritarian politics from deciding
many issues that are not widely seen as momentous. The numerous provisions
of the U.S. Constitution ignored in most constitutional law classes and
scholarship are something more than "junk DNA" for this country.
Similarly, popular constitutionalism is not confined to the protracted, all-
consuming constitutional moments that Professor Ackerman describes. Just as
We the People did not lose our constitutional voice on major issues in the
twentieth century,7 so too we did not give up removing more prosaic matters
from everyday politics. Our founding document contains numerous petit
constitutional provisions. So did the Reconstruction Amendments (in the
middle sections of the Fourteenth Amendment). And so, too, we continue to
move lower-salience aspects of our governance into and out of the majoritarian
political sphere. Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have described
this process in general terms and provided a number of valuable case studies of
petit constitutionalism expressed through super-statutes." Most Americans,
however, think far more about the content of legal rules than about those rules'
form: statutes, regulations, case law, or some combination. Lawyers should not
presume to impose their conceptions of orderly governance on an electorate
that focuses on statutes far less than lawyers do.'
5. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 46.
6. But see PAUL VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 103 (2007) (discussing the Marque and
Reprisal Clause).
7. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 17.
8. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).
9. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 32-35 (criticizing narrow-canon constitutionalism on this
ground).
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Just as Professor Ackerman makes a compelling case that broadening the
constitutional canon enhances democracy, so too can other, more diminutive
popular choices to remove issues from majoritarian control broaden real
democracy. With elections fought out over small handfuls of issues,"o showing
unblinking reverence to decisions made by someone appointed by someone
who was appointed by someone who was appointed by someone who never
came close to addressing that question in her or his campaign" makes a
mockery of real democracy." Where We the People have come together to
decide important issues of public policy through a focused, inclusive process-
albeit ones less momentous than those typically addressed in grand
constitutionalism -these judgments deserve respect and adherence. This essay
contends that these decisions to remove issues from partisan debate are
effectively a lesser form of constitutionalism.
Broadening our understanding of popular constitutionalism also is
essential if we are to extend counter-majoritarian protection to a broader range
of politically, socially, and economically marginalized groups. Only a small
minority of the social and economic minorities in our country will succeed in
galvanizing the nation sufficiently to produce a grand constitutional moment.
Without petit constitutionalism, all those excluded would be left to the tender
mercies of majoritarian politics. Although African Americans' subjugation
holds a special place in U.S. history, they were by no means the only important
group facing severe marginalization during the 1950s and since. Native
Americans as well as Latinos and Latinas were subject to systematic racial
discrimination, dispossession of property, and hate crimes. They were
effectively blocked from political participation in areas where they might have
had sufficient collective power to change their circumstances. Yet they largely
failed to ignite constitutional moments of their own. Some of the achievements
lo. See DANIEL YANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN A
COMPLEX WORLD 165-66 (1991) (arguing that the electorate is capable of weighing no more
than two or three issues at a time).
n1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001) (giving
numerous examples of such exercises of power, much of it by officials not even subject to
Senate confirmation).
12. At times, despite decades of making dubious claims of executive officials' democratic
accountability to justify judicial deference, even the Court feels compelled to reject the
"Princess and the Pea" theory that we can feel the pea of democracy no matter how many
mattresses of appointments cover it. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
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the Civil Rights Revolution won for African Americans benefited these groups
too, but to the extent their needs and problems were different, they received
little relief.' Women, LGBTQ~ people, religious minorities, people with
disabilities, the very young and the very old, and low-income people received
even less incidental protection while facing very real problems.
The fatigue and the desire to return to the entertainments of ordinary life
that Professor Ackerman describes can work against groups trying to build on
the achievements of a grand constitutional moment. Part of what allows a
movement to successfully place a constitutional discussion on the political
agenda is that that movement raises its concerns in a novel way. By the time
other groups are seeking similar attention, the novelty of the appeal is gone,
and with it, the opportunity to shape the public agenda. People remember
Medgar Evers,' 4 but not Juan de la Cruz."
In practice, defending the social, economic, and political position of
marginalized groups requires both effective maneuvering within the realm of
elite politics and the ability to identify and sell clear, specific improvements
during fleeting periods of broader public engagement. Pursuing both of these
requirements together has at times proven problematic: efforts to empower
communities previously marginalized from politics can be an awkward fit with
the complex, often obscure, give-and-take of elite politics. And when the
group's concerns do occasionally engage the public's attention, the scope of the
group's pent-up need can make it difficult to refine and present an agenda for
change that is focused enough to be politically viable in the limited amount of
time before the public's attention wanes. In addition, although it has become
fashionable to disparage civil rights litigation in general, and anti-poverty
litigation in particular, such litigation can be vital for groups that lack the
13. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding the exclusion of the large
numbers of Latinos and Latinas lacking U.S. citizenship from Medicare Part B); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (addressing the conflict between statutes protecting
dispossessed Native Americans and general civil rights legislation).
14. Medgar Evers was an NAACP leader murdered by a sniper in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1963.
See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at 1o8 (1998)
(noting that "the murder of Medgar Evers changed the language of race in American mass
culture overnight").
1s. Juan de la Cruz was a United Farm Workers leader killed on a picket line in August 1973.
His murder, and that of Nagi Daifullah a few days before, led Cesar Chavez to end the grape
workers' strike and put his faith in the second Grape Boycott. JACQUES E. LEVY, CESAR
CHAVEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LA CAUSA 505-10 (1975).
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resources to protect and entrench the gains won during periods of broad public
engagement.
Although this essay's focus is on civil rights, and specifically those of low-
income people, the same dynamic affects civil liberties. The segment of the
electorate that makes any particular liberty a major touchstone of its political
outlook is typically quite small, analogous to a group pressing civil rights
claims on its own behalf or on behalf of those with whom it sympathizes.
These groups may find some relief in constitutional litigation, but for the most
part they must make the same kinds of choices, described here, between
participation in majoritarian politics and the pursuit of petit constitutional
protection outside of ordinary politics.
This essay contends that, for marginal groups unable to seize the public
imagination or struggling to preserve the gains achieved through grand
constitutional politics, two very different options exist. One, which is widely
recognized, is to immerse themselves in the rough-and-tumble of regular
partisan politics. The other is to seek to achieve petit constitutional status for
some of the norms important to them. Each path has characteristic
opportunities and limitations.
Like Professor Ackerman's account of popular grand constitutionalism, this
essay gives only passing attention to textual petit constitutionalism. Instead, it
undertakes a somewhat parallel inquiry into the means and consequences of
popular petit constitutional decision-making. It proceeds as follows. Part I
explores the options available to marginal groups in a two-party system,
including the promise and drawbacks of petit constitutionalism. Part II traces
how low-income people and their advocates have vacillated between regular
politics and petit constitutionalism, with quite deleterious results. Part III
concludes by briefly sketching some examples of other groups' experiences
with each of these paths, including vulnerable populations as well as groups
defined by their prioritizing particular civil liberties.
1. MARGINAL GROUPS IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM
Conventional wisdom suggests that interest groups have two options in a
two-party system: joining the core constituencies of one of the parties or
attempting to position themselves as a swing group pursued by both sides.
In fact, groups have a third option, one that can play an important role in
understanding outcomes that seem to defy standard public choice theory. In
this third position, groups eschew clear alignment with either party and accept
that they lack the numbers or coherence to function effectively as a swing
group. Instead, they appeal on non-ideological grounds to what they assert are
petit constitutional values about the nation's basic character. A modest number
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of conscientious policymakers in both parties may elevate awareness of the
group's concerns and help articulate why they should be regarded as
fundamental. But the group's success rises or falls based on the effectiveness of
these moral arguments.
This is the position that iconic leaders such as the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall adopted in the early years of their struggle
when they had few reliable friends in either party. It is reflected in the
American Civil Liberties Union's slogan "no permanent friends and no
permanent enemies."16
This Part considers each of these three choices. Section A explores the
opportunities and risks of vulnerable groups' engagement in the classic options
of ordinary partisan politics. Section B then explores the workings of petit
popular constitutionalism.
A. How Marginal Groups Can Impact Partisan Politics
In our heavily majoritarian system, partisan politics is the primary means
for advancing one's interests on large matters and small. Having influence on
the party winning a clear majority can allow a group to pass transformative
legislation, such as the Reagan, Gingrich, and Bush tax cuts or the Affordable
Care Act; to select top executive officials; and to stock the high courts with
like-minded judges. It also allows the group to control myriad smaller matters
of policy, from the drafting of obscure legislative provisions to the issuance of
administrative rules and executive orders and the appointment of trial judges.
In our two-party system, an interest group may obtain this influence in
either of two distinct ways. First, it may become a swing constituency, inviting
the major parties to bid for their support. The popular narrative of U.S. politics
valorizes the swing constituency, and the news media attends to swing groups
(and their constituents, often political independents) out of all proportion to
their actual importance. We invest independence with Solomonic wisdom and
treat swing groups as guarantors of moderation."
16. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Announces Collaboration with Rep. Bob Barr; Says
Conservative Congressman Will Consult on Privacy Issues (Nov. 25, 2002),
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-announces-collaboration-rep-bob-barr
-says-conservative-congressman-will-.
17. See, e.g., David S. Broder & Richard Morin, Trying to Find Which Way 'Swing' Voters Will
Go, ALB. TIMES UNION, Sept. 25, 1988, at A3.
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The reality is considerably less admirable. Independents tend to be among
the least informed and the least sophisticated voters, and the swing groups that
seek to marshal them are typically pursuing particularistic rather than national
interests. i
Second, an interest group instead may become part of one major party's
base. This allows them a broader role in helping to formulate that party's
program and the opportunity to insert their partisans in public office and the
party hierarchy. Thus, not only can the group shape the party's platform on
major issues vital to the group, but this personalization of politics provides
numerous opportunities to turn smaller policy decisions in its favor. Our
political discourse is sometimes unkind to loyal adherents to a single political
party, but that position has considerable practical compensation.
1. The Preconditions to Effectiveness in Partisan Politics
Both the swing position and integration into a party's base, however,
require specific capability and conditions to be successful. Most obviously, for a
group to occupy either position, it must be sufficiently numerous to interest
the political parties. Does anyone know- or care - about the political leanings
of Swiss Americans or the owners of exotic pets?
In addition, one or both parties must actually want the group's support. If
the group's support will guarantee the enmity of a larger bloc of voters or
contributors whose loyalties are also up for grabs, both parties may take pains
to show the less powerful group the door.'9 Indeed, the parties may each accuse
one another of relying on the pariah group. Neither party competes openly for
the support of ex-offenders or Klansmen, and each denounces assertions that it
does so covertly.
Functioning effectively in either position also requires strong group
identity. This country has millions of bridge players, but until that identity
comes to dominate those players' political behavior, few politicians will be
courting the American Contract Bridge League. Political identities can evolve;
evangelical Christians in the 1970s and 198os, and LGBTQ people more
18. Rebecca Berg, Few Voters Are Truly Up for Grabs, Research Shows, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o8/17/us/politics/pursuing-the-elusive-swing-voter.html.
19. See, e.g., David Broder, How Did High Hopes Come Down to This?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30,
1988, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-lo-30/news/880212oi84_i-dukakis-strategy
-natural-majority-party-democrats (reporting that Republican and most Democratic leaders
believe that Democratic interest groups alienate swing voters).
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recently, have politicized their identities and drawn corresponding partisan
attention.
Beyond this sense of group identity and identification, being a swing group
or an influential bloc within a party's core demands considerable coordination.
For the parties to bid aggressively for a swing group's support, they must be
convinced that the group will actually swing en masse. This requires either wide
recognition of a few opinion leaders in the group or a sufficiently attentive
membership to move in predictable directions in response to parties' and
candidates' positions. Functioning as a member of a party's core calls for an
even more difficult form of coordination; maintaining influence within the
party requires bloc voting in primaries, financial contributions, or usually both.
Keeping the group together without the guidance of party labels places
especially great demands on the group's leaders to inform and mobilize their
constituencies.
Many groups pursuing their aims within partisan politics lack many of
these capabilities and, as a result, face almost constant frustration. Part II will
show that low-income people are particularly ill-equipped to pursue these
modes of advocacy.
2. Comparing the Benefits and Risks ofBeing Swing and Core Constituencies
Parties' core constituencies have a greater bandwidth of influence, which
may be important if their members have copious needs. That position is more
difficult to maintain effectively, as noted above, and it also faces considerably
greater risks. A group's persistent alignment with one party leaves the other
party free to attack the group in the hope of securing support from the group's
opponents.
When the group's chosen party is out of power for whatever reason, the
groups' members will be highly vulnerable. This is particularly true for groups
with determined opponents, who will tend to congregate in the opposing
party's base. With the growth of national political party identities, interest
groups have greater difficulty adopting inconsistent affiliations across states.
This leaves Democratic constituencies perpetually at risk in red states and
Republican constituencies persistently exposed in blue ones. Many policy
programs take different amounts of time to install and to dismantle. Thus, for
example, the Affordable Care Act will require virtually the entire two-term
Obama presidency to enact and bring to operational equilibrium, yet neither
repealing it nor dismantling its infrastructure would pose any particular
operational challenges. Conversely, the Gingrich and Bush tax cuts were
enacted and implemented quickly, but unwinding them would require
imposing financial pain on large numbers of voters as well as complicated
2815
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
transition rules. Groups whose programs are readily uprooted during partisan
alternations will be at great risk if they become members of a party's base.
In addition, if the party's other constituents come to see a group that has
been in the partisan core as a liability, the group has little leverage. The most it
can plausibly threaten in the short term is that its constituents will decline to
vote or contribute.2 o But a swing group of only half the size can have the same
political influence by threatening to flip to the other party." And if the other
party's platform is inimical to the group's interests, even abstinence will not be
a realistic threat. Even in the longer term, if the opposing party's coalition
includes many people hostile to the group's members, everyone will recognize
that the group has nowhere to go and hence has little leverage.
These risks may be acceptable to groups pursuing a longer-term ideological
agenda whose vital interests are not immediately threatened if a few elections
go to the hostile party. Thus, some environmentalists and leftists effectively
abstained in the 2000 election by voting for Ralph Nader in the hopes of
disciplining the Democratic Party.
A special set of problems arise when several marginal groups
simultaneously seek to become core members of either political party's
coalition. In this situation, sympathetic legislators can be seen as a kind of
scarce, communally owned resource. Many, especially in close districts, can
afford to support some but not all of these groups' causes without alienating
too many marginal voters and losing their seats. Perhaps they could vote to
20. Parties ordinarily have little reason to develop programs attractive to the core constituencies
of their opponents. If a party becomes aware of a possibility to recruit a segment of the
other's base, it may try to modify its positions but may be constrained by members of its
own base hostile to the group it seeks to attract. Republicans seeking African American and
Hispanic votes, and Democrats trying to increase their Catholic support, have encountered
this problem. See, e.g., Bruce Lambert, Suozzi Calls for "Common Ground" on Reducing
Abortions, N.Y. TuiEs, May 11, 2005, at B5 (describing pro-choice groups' criticism of
Democratic county executive calling for bipartisan cooperation to promote alternatives to
abortions); William March, Jeb Bush's Hedging on Immigration Resonates, TAMPA TRIB.,
Mar. 11, 2013, http://tbo.con/news/politics/jeb-bushs-hedging-on-immigration-resonates
-b82461747z1 (describing criticism of a prospective GOP presidential candidate for seeming
to shift his stance on immigration).
21. For example, having 5oo voters switch to the other party has the same net effect as losing
1,ooo voters who stay home.
22. See Ken Foskett, Nader a Growing Risk for Gore in the Northwest, Environmental Bloc Could
Cost the Vice President the Election, Democratic Strategists Say, ATL. JOUR.-CONST., Oct. 23,
2000, at A4 (describing environmentalists' anger that Vice President Gore did not take more
forceful positions on some issues).
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limit the death penalty, to support same-sex marriages, to regulate greenhouse
gases, or to increase the inheritance tax, but not all four. If each interest group
in the party's base maintains a claim on these legislators' votes, the result is a
sort of tragedy of the commons in which the legislators are overexposed, lose,
and become of no use to anyone. Each group's consumption of the legislators'
political capital has negative externalities on each of the others.
A classic response to this sort of problem is private ownership, but applying
that concept to these legislators is challenging. In the near term, the legislator
"owns" her or his vote. But legislators' limited mandates make them far more
like tenants than owners. Moreover, legislators elected in a partisan election
also are representatives of their parties, which in turn are "owned" by their core
constituencies. They are subject to primary challenges or to the elimination of
fundraising assistance should they alienate their parties. Party leaders may try
to ration usage of their legislators' votes by limiting what comes to a vote, but
the opposing party often can force votes on amendments. And party leaders,
too, are "owned" by the various elements of their partisan bases.
Without a good mechanism for picking which causes to abandon,
legislators and party leaders will act based on how many votes they expect to
lose by supporting each group's agenda, each group's potential to punish the
party by withholding money and votes, or their subjective sense of which cause
is most important. Legislators may misjudge how many hard votes they can
afford to cast and lose their seats. If various legislators make disparate choices,
no group may win a majority in the legislature even though the legislators each
weakened themselves with some hard votes.
Coordinating demands among the groups within a party's base is likely to
prove difficult, too. Legislators one group wants to reward will be on another
group's list for punishment. Each group will be better off if it makes aggressive
demands while other groups show restraint, but as in the game of chicken, the
party will face disaster if no groups swerve. If the groups' constituencies of
voters or funders overlap partially, they may be leery of confronting one
another directly. More generally, building the ideological fervor crucial to the
capacity to punish deviant legislators reduces groups' capacity to moderate
their demands, thus increasing the likelihood of future collisions.
For all of these reasons, at least some interest groups that might think it
natural to be within one or another party's base would be well-advised to
pursue a different strategy. And as Part II discusses, low-income people are
particularly vulnerable to almost all of these risks.
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B. Petit Popular Constitutionalism
Petit constitutionalism, like Professor Ackerman's popular grand
constitutionalism, reflects the modern reality that partisan divisions have
increasingly replaced regional ones. Thus, fundamental lawmaking now
depends upon reaching broad agreement including significant members of
both partisan coalitions rather than ratification by a super-majority of states. In
each case, the point is to confirm that a broad majority of the country regards
the point in question as not just being valid, but also important enough to
constitutionalize.
A petit constitutional moment occurs when a firm consensus forms that a
particular principle or value cannot be questioned without placing oneself
firmly outside of the respectable range of political opinion. Professors Eskridge
and Ferejohn offer one model for generating petit constitutional law through
super-statutes." In their account, the process has three steps: (1) a new
statutory policy displaces the common law or a prior statutory regime, (2) the
new policy is reached through a widely publicized deliberative process, and (3)
that new policy becomes entrenched over time.
This is fine as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. On many occasions, We
the People make petit constitutional law with only incidental incorporation of
statutes-or none at all. And at times, the driving force is not thoughtful
deliberation but strong, simultaneous gut reactions. That these collective moral
expectations of our leaders take on constitutional character- delegitimizing
those that ignore or dispute them -should come as no surprise in a nation that
defines itself by ideals rather than by an ethnicity.
Just as grand constitutionalism can loosely, and somewhat ahistorically, be
divided into structural and individual rights aspects, the same is true of petit
constitutionalism. The U.S. Constitution did not win ratification on the
strength of the detailed procedures for what we now call "pocket vetoes" or the
two-witness requirement for treason convictions, but those provisions have the
same force as the Presentment and Due Process Clauses. Professor Ackerman's
account of popular grand constitutionalism similarly encompasses changes to
both the structure and powers of the national government during the New
Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution from the 1950s to the 1970s. Its petit
cousin similarly may be divided.
23. ESKRIDGE &FEREJOHN, Supra note 8, at 6-8.
24. Id. at 26.
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1. Constitutional Structure
Petit popular constitutionalism finds numerous examples, often quite
prosaic, in the structure of government. Thus, for example, no public official of
either party could refuse to attempt to rescue stranded climbers on Mt.
McKinley even if the climbers had disregarded Park Service warnings. Nothing
in the written Constitution even arguably creates these positive rights; no
statute, much less a super-statute, imposes such a burden. But our popular
constitution has a norm requiring government to attempt to save the lives of
even the most foolhardy of our peers.
Similarly, nothing in the written Constitution imposes any obligations on
the federal government to look after the welfare of our diplomats posted
overseas. Yet popular understandings of the duties of the president dictate
otherwise. President Carter's inability to protect or obtain the release of our
diplomats in Tehran was seen as every bit as much of a failure of constitutional
duty as if he had failed to deliver a State of the Union message.2 s Republicans'
persistent attacks on the Obama Administration's failure to protect our people
in Benghazi reflect an appreciation of this constitutional principle.
A more significant petit constitutional moment occurred over the past few
years concerning the federal debt limit. When the federal government first
approached the debt limit in 2011, congressional Republicans denied they had
an unqualified duty to act and insisted they were free to demand concessions as
they would on most other legislative proposals. President Obama reluctantly
agreed, accepting the crippling budget cuts of sequestration. By 2013, the
President was prepared to assert that Congress did have such a categorical duty
and to refuse to engage on the specifics of budgetary legislation (on which the
electorate might have sympathized with the Republicans). After polls showed a
decisive swing against Congress, Speaker Boehner twice brought unconditional
debt limitation legislation to the House that the great majority of his own party
opposed,26 while Senate Minority Leader McConnell chided his caucus for
25. See Steven R. Weisman, For America, a Painful Reawakening, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/o5/17/magazine/for-america-a-painful-reawakening
.html (describing the electorate's loss of faith in President Carter over the failure).
26. Cristina Marcos & Paul M. Krawzak, Battle Over, but "War" Continues, CQWKLY. 1756-58,
Oct. 21, 2013. Speaker Boehner thus not only violated the Boehner Rule, requiring dollar-
for-dollar offsets for increases in the debt limit, but also the Hastert Rule, allowing
consideration only of legislation supported by a majority of the majority.
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forgetting the lessons of previous failed efforts to leverage government
shutdowns.2
This illustrates the general pattern of popular petit constitutionalism. One
branch of the federal government, or one or more states, will assert either that
it is not obliged to undertake a function traditionally assigned to it or that
another entity has some particular duty. Another branch or level of government
will contradict that assertion, not on the merits of the policies at issue, but as a
general matter of law. The contestants resort to We the People. Because the
pragmatic U.S. electorate is notoriously averse to deciding questions as matters
of principle," the most common result is a failure to make constitutional law at
all: the electorate either refuses to intervene decisively or resolves the dispute
on its underlying substantive merits. The electorate's aversion to needless
higher lawmaking both deters and disappoints attempts at overreaching. When
a resolution is rendered, however, the defeated entity hastily retreats and
proceeds without regard to its usual partisan commitments.
Settlements achieved in this manner preoccupy the electorate less and
hence make a significantly less indelible mark on our constitutional fabric than
do grand constitutional moments. Even casual students of U.S. history know
about Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution;
although it is far more recent, many have forgotten, or never learned about, the
1995 government shutdowns. 9 Reversing the achievements of grand
constitutional decision-making would require a massive, prolonged new
constitutional moment; in a couple of decades, however, one or the other party
might try shutting down the government again to extort policy concessions,
betting that its opponent cannot mobilize the electorate's collective memory.
27. Ruth Marcus, Op-Ed, A Moment for Flexibility by Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-a-moment-for-flexibility-by
-democrats/2013/10/18/27b6770c-3827-11e3-ae46-e4248e75c8ea story.html.
28. See YANKELOVICH, supra note so, at 171-74 (finding that accommodating rather than
selecting between competing values is the dominant mode of public decision-making).
This same instinct has given us a divided federal government in thirty-three of the
forty-six years since the 1968 election. (President Carter enjoyed a Democratic Congress for
his four years in office, Presidents Clinton and Obama had majorities in both chambers for
their first two years, and President George W. Bush had a Republican Congress for five of
his first six years in office.)
29. This abbreviated lifespan actually characterized a few textual petit constitutional rules as
well. The Guarantee Clause's purpose and utility was largely forgotten once the founding
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2. Individual Rights
The process for initiating popular petit constitutionalism around individual
rights follows a somewhat different track. Those seeking to constitutionalize a
norm-whether concerned with the well-being of a particular group or
changing the rights of everyone in this country-recruit champions within each
political party. These are unlikely to come from the party's top leadership, who
focus primarily on areas in which their parties can differentiate themselves
from one another. Indeed, the requisite willingness to work across party lines is
more likely to be found in members of the respective party caucuses with
limited aspirations for higher positions. The champions must, however, retain
enough credibility within their parties to deter others in their party from
attacking the cause.
The role of these transpartisan champions is quite different from that of
swing voters, whom a dominant party typically extracts from the most
ideologically congenial wing of its opponent. Presidents Reagan and George
W. Bush won approval for their tax cuts by picking off a handful of
Democrats; three Republicans gave President Obama the votes he needed to
pass the 2009 stimulus law. But in each case, the legislation remained fiercely
contested by the opposing party: the defectors provided votes but not
legitimacy, and the underlying initiative may not have been moderated at all.
Many petit constitutional moments lack the breadth and intensity of positive
engagement that characterizes grand constitutionalism, but the leadership of
core members of each party's coalition, and the excising of features offensive to
each party's core, allows the minimization of negative engagement on the issue.
In a grand constitutional moment, a broad, intense, sustained positive force
may overwhelm an equally intense opposition; petit constitutional settlements
occur by eliminating rather than crushing opposition.
The engagement of these champions, and the narrowing of proposals to the
point that both parties will engage, is the pivotal part of the process.
Afterwards, Congress may enact a transformative super-statute after inclusive
deliberation and entrench it over time.30 But the consensus program can
become concretized in other ways, such as the broad embrace of a Court
decision.
The transaction between groups and politicians is fundamentally different
in petit constitutionalism. Groups advocating expansion of the petit
30. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 8, at 26 (describing this process).
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constitutional canon generally cannot offer policymakers partisan gain beyond
the incremental reputational benefit of being perceived as honorable and
conscientious. For example, civil libertarians usually have not been a politically
significant group for whose allegiance politicians must compete. Outside of
suburban Washington and a few districts with large military bases, federal
employees are not a political force of much concern to members of Congress.
The African American vote in the 195os was somewhat more substantial, but
any overt, concerted attempts to appeal to it would send a larger, better-
organized bloc of white racists in the opposite direction.
Instead, groups seeking help entrenching their priorities as petit
constitutional principles offer only the satisfaction of fulfilling the broader
responsibilities of their offices. This same motivation, honor, has traditionally
been thought to be paramount in the judicial branch and among civil servants.
Of course, some legislators really do fit the simplistic model of vote and
contribution maximizers, just as some judges and bureaucrats are ideological
hacks. Yet without a broader sense of professionalism and duty on the part of
legislators, numerous important but low-profile public functions would never
be funded.
On occasion, successful engagement in the political process as a swing
group can morph into a status protected by petit constitutionalism. For
decades, politicians of both parties lived in fear of offending World War II
veterans and their spouses, and many were punished at the polls for doing so.
To protect themselves, many adopted expansive rhetoric about taking care of
the elderly, honoring the "Greatest Generation," and the like. Even though that
generation's numbers have ebbed beyond the point of direct political
significance, the longstanding, bipartisan celebration of its virtue makes any of
its recognized interests effectively unassailable. A similar migration from a
position within the core of one partisan coalition would be far more difficult.
The petit constitutional strategy has serious limitations. In particular, ad
hoc coalitions of a few conscientious Democrats and a few conscientious
Republicans lack the power to accomplish what some core or swing
constituencies can. Yet pursuing these modest gains requires its proponents to
abandon partisan politics and all of the policy gains and personal power that
party alignments can bring: a group cannot ride petit constitutionalism as far
as it will go and then alight to join a partisan coalition (or even become a swing
group). Aligning temporarily or permanently with either party would put the
group's supporters within the other party in an untenable position, at best as
mavericks and more likely as traitors. Whether those supporters abandon the
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cause or accept ostracism within their party, they will no longer be able to
protect the advances the group won through petit constitutionalism. This also
means that the gains sought must be modest enough not to conflict with either
party's basic program.
On the other hand, this approach has distinct advantages over partisan
politics. Most obviously, it is a strategy available to groups unable to function
effectively within the partisan arena." It also affords a measure of immunity
against partisan attacks; its separation from each of the two parties limits the
utility of either party attacking the group, and the engagement of some leaders
from each party assures the presence of respected voices in each party's councils
opposing efforts to build a strategy around such attacks. Staying separate from
either party obviates the need to form conceptually awkward and potentially
unstable coalitions." Existing outside of the partisan landscape also may tamp
down cynicism when advocates make uncontroversial moral arguments. And
the achievements of petit constitutionalism are less vulnerable to devastation
when an unsympathetic party holds a stable majority.
The relative power of political and petit constitutional advocacy may seem
paradoxical. We recognize constitutionalism as our system's highest form of
law and imagine it as far more powerful than ordinary legislation. And, indeed,
the textual and popular results of grand constitutionalism dominate the legal
landscape. Yet groups can pursue far more ambitious agendas through
ordinary politics than through petit constitutionalism. The key to
disentangling this paradox is differentiating strength from breadth. A group
pursuing constitutional status-petit or grand-must narrow its demands to
achieve the necessary super-majoritarian support; it trades the abandoned
elements of its program for what it hopes will be the entrenchment of the
remaining elements. Thus, for example, Franklin Roosevelt had the votes to
enact more aggressively redistributionist legislation than the Social Security
Act. He choose a relatively modest version to ensure that it would become
entrenched and unassailable.33
31. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
32. For example, both abortion rights advocates -who support individual choice on whether to
terminate pregnancies - and teachers' unions -who generally oppose individual choice on
whether to receive publicly subsidized education in private schools -serve as core members
of the Democratic constituency. This prevents the Party from defining itself coherently as
pro- or anti-libertarian.
33. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 8, at 175-76.
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II. PARTISAN POLITICS, PETIT CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND LOW-
INCOME PEOPLE
The politics of economic and social deprivation in this country have long
been strangely bifurcated. Concern about "poverty" has been bipartisan and led
to positive, if often ineffectual, policies. By contrast, the politics of "welfare"
have been vitriolic and commonly partisan. The politics of welfare are
characterized by rights-talk on the left and denunciations of presumption on
the right; discussions of poverty focus on human needs, albeit sometimes in a
patronizing or insensitive manner. The National Welfare Rights Organization,
organized by people at the periphery of the Civil Rights Movement in the
196os, was devoted to building political power among low-income people; the
very notion of rights to welfare infuriated many moderates and conservatives.
By contrast, organizations addressing poverty are treated as noble.
This bifurcated response to an essentially unitary problem reflects two very
different political strategies. Welfare policy has become enmeshed in partisan
politics, specifically with the welfare rights movement seeking a place in the
Democratic Party's base. Anti-poverty advocates, on the other hand, have
sought to avoid partisanship and constitutionalize the principle that society
must respond to extreme poverty at least to the extent of preventing severe
hardship.
Welfare rights as a concept was likely doomed to be part of partisan
struggle-and to fare badly in that struggle-for several reasons. "Welfare"
remains a heavily racialized concept with much of the electorate for many
reasons." The Civil Rights Movement bequeathed to the welfare rights
movement much of the seething ill-will it had generated but all too little of its
support: when it became socially unacceptable to express open contempt for
people of color, shifting animus to welfare recipients presented an appealing
alternative to many. In addition, welfare became identified specifically with
idleness, an assumption fed by racial stereotypes" and seemingly supported in
reality after President Reagan won changes in Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) rules that effectively disqualified most parents working
outside the home.
34. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999).
35. See Joe Soss et al., The Hard Line and the Color Line: Race, Welfare, and the Roots ofGet-Tough
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The pivotal question has been whether the toxic politics of "welfare" would
absorb and hopelessly contaminate efforts to help low-income people in other
ways or whether it could be a foil for those efforts, something from which
other programs could effectively distinguish themselves. Any program can be
attacked, and any large program will inevitably have shortcomings. In-kind
programs' lower profiles, however, allowed them to blend into the background
while their advocates focused on the noble goal of reducing poverty rather than
the intricacies of their management. This relative invisibility made these
programs difficult to manage through partisan, majoritarian politics3 7 but
superb vehicles for implementing a non-partisan petit constitutional consensus
against allowing extreme poverty.
During most of the last half-century, this political separation has been
reflected in a separation of programs and laws, with cash assistance programs
responding to partisan welfare politics and in-kind assistance programs falling
under the anti-poverty rubric. Of course, this dichotomy does not withstand
serious scrutiny: welfare is an anti-poverty program, and many of the most
reviled features of welfare- including limited individual entitlements"' -are
also present in many in-kind programs. This incoherence has periodically
allowed the temporary collapsing of the line between welfare and anti-poverty
policy and the shifting of programs across that line.
In the 196os, Lyndon Johnson launched the War on Poverty with a wide
range of initiatives that deliberately excluded welfare-and delayed efforts to
eliminate an ill-conceived cap on welfare payments that threatened to bring the
system crashing down just as the Civil Rights Revolution broke down the
barriers that previously denied benefits to African Americans." Richard Nixon
sent Congress proposals to "aid the poor" and to "reform welfare"; the former
initiatives passed with bipartisan support 0 while the latter died in a firestorm
36. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HowARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 64-74 (1997) (describing the earned income tax
credit).
37. See, e.g., SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: How INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 36-47 (2011) (finding low-salience programs
are less likely to induce political activism by their recipients).
38. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 636-40
(2004) (offering alternative definitions of "entitlement").
39. David A. Super, The Quiet "Welfare" Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the
Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1278 (2004).
40. Among his most important achievements were expanding food stamps into a nationwide
program, replacing inadequate state categorical programs with Supplemental Security
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of controversy.4 1 Jimmy Carter had parallel experiences.42 In 1981, when
Ronald Reagan sought broad cuts to social programs, he tried to relocate the
boundary between the two realms so that most anti-poverty spending would
be considered welfare; by mid-decade, the boundary had shifted back to its
prior position and the slashed programs began to recover fiscally and
politically. In 1994, Newt Gingrich's Contract with America tried an even
more aggressive boundary-shifting game, achieving even larger cuts in the
near-term and triggering an even stronger movement to restore in-kind
programs after the welfare and anti-poverty political cultures once again
separated.44 On the other hand, in some states, cash assistance programs have
had little partisan valence, allowing them to be governed in part by the petit
constitutional principle of avoiding severe hardship.4 s
Although the separation is incomplete and not wholly consistent over time,
the simultaneous operation of ordinary political advocacy and petit
constitutional advocacy with respect to essentially the same problem provides a
valuable natural experiment for comparing the two. Section A examines the
ordinary politics of welfare as a means of protecting low-income people.
Section B assesses the contributions of petit constitutionalism.
Income for the low-income elderly and people with disabilities, and the establishment of the
Section 8 voucher program that separated housing assistance from residence in large, often-
decrepit housing projects. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORYOF WELFARE INAMERICA 266-68 (1986).
41. Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP), designed by liberal Democratic sociologist Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, would have substituted a federal payment of $2,400 per year for states'
bureaucratic administration of AFDC, which commonly had much lower benefit levels.
Conservatives criticized this as an expansion of the federal government and a benefit
expansion for single mothers; welfare rights advocates attacked the benefit level as
inadequate and its modest work requirements as coercive. WALTER 1. TRATTNER, FROM
POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 340-42 (5th ed.
1994).
42. Carter's Basic Jobs and Incomes Program resembled FAP in many respects, including its
provision of a federal floor on benefits for low-income people. It was even broader in that it
reached those without children. It was defeated by the same Right-Left pincer that crushed
FAP. See KATZ, supra note 40, at 269; TRATTNER, supra note 41, at 355-58. On the other
hand, Carter won a dramatic expansion of the food stamp program, reaching large numbers
of the working poor for the first time. See Super, supra note 39, at 1278-79.
43. Id. at 1279.
44, Id. at 1283-87.
45. See, e.g., Paula Wade, Sundquist Walks Fine Line on Welfare, COM. APPEAL, Feb. 11, 1996, at
B7 (describing the moderate welfare proposals of a conservative Tennessee governor
drawing criticism only from the extreme right).
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A. Low-Income People's Challenges in Leveraging Partisan Politics
Low-income people certainly are numerous. But that, by itself, is not
enough to make them an effective interest group in partisan politics.
Subsection i explains how low-income people lack each of the major qualities
described in Part I as essential to effective navigation of partisan politics, either
as a swing group or as a member of one party's base. Subsection 2 then
summarizes the disastrous history of partisan welfare politics, culminating
ironically in a petit constitutional moment - for the other side.
1. Low-Income People's Fundamental Weakness as an Interest Group
First and foremost, low-income people have lacked the coordination
required to exert power in partisan politics. No national leader or organization
has sufficiently wide acceptance among low-income people to be able to move
large numbers of their votes by signaling support or antipathy for candidates
or parties. State politics similarly lack recognized opinion leaders of low-
income people. Developing recognizable, reliable leadership for low-income
people is difficult because the very qualities that can cause someone to be an
effective leader also are likely to allow them to exit the group affected by anti-
poverty policies. Those continuing to have low incomes are likely to be
confronting serious material hardships that distract them from their
advocacy.46 The paucity of internal party leaders identifying primarily with
low-income people leaves them with few means of disciplining wayward
politicians. Few primaries frame clear differences on policy toward low-income
people, and most of those are "down-ballot," requiring coordination and
mobilization that is far beyond low-income people's advocates' capacity.
Although presidential races more readily capture broad attention-and
Presidents Carter, Obama, and particularly Clinton all proposed substantial
46. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (finding former welfare recipients with no
income too distracted by their struggles to find the basic necessities of life to pursue
challenges to their terminations); DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A
PULITZER PRIZE-WINNING JOURNALIST'S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE (1999)
(describing the arduous and degrading work a welfare rights advocate had to do to support
herself and her children); see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, WHY DON'T AMERICAN CITIES BURN?
178-200 (2012) (finding that urban elites have found effective means to divide and manage
the marginalized).
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cuts in programs for low-income people"- the costs of challenging incumbent
presidents are very high.** Only President Carter faced serious primary
opposition, and that said relatively little about his performance in this area
(which was far better than that of President Clinton).
In addition, a large fraction of low-income people do not primarily identify
as such. Some of those with low incomes at any given time are only transitorily
in distress and continue to identify with their prior (and presumed future)
status."9 This is a country, after all, in which almost everyone likes to identify
as being "middle class." Others may be too ashamed to want their economic
position to define them as voters. Still others may have other, stronger
identities based on their race, ethnicity, religion, or other attributes. This
diversity of outlooks also prevents the development of a consensus on a
programmatic agenda; some low-income people support greater transfer or
human capital development programs, others may see their problems as
originating in racial or gender discrimination, and still others may embrace
hostile stereotypes and actually favor punitive measures against those like
themselves.
Even if low-income people's interests could be defined in a politically
meaningful way, and even if a party's support for those interests could expand
allegiance among swing voters or turnout from core voters, that support has a
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-788, at 12 (198o), reprinted at 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 843, 845
(describing food stamp cuts as sought by Administration); Super, supra note 39, at 1299
n.97 (describing steady increase in amounts Clinton Administration proposed to cut from
food stamps during 1995-96 legislative debates); Press Release, Nat'l Org. of Social
Sec. Claimants' Representatives, Statement of the National Organization of Social
Security Claimants' Representatives Regarding Social Security Proposals in the
Administration's FY 2015 Budget (Mar. 4, 2014) http://www.nosscr.org/news/2014
/o3/statement-national-organization-social-security-claimants%E2%8o%99-representatives
-regarding (condemning new proposed cuts in SSI and applauding Administration for not
reiterating prior proposals for cuts); Letter from Food Research and Action Center et al. to
U.S. Senators (Sept. 17, 2oo), http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/20o/o8/snap-offset
signers.pdf (urging the U.S. Senate to avoid benefit cuts to the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program).
48. The twentieth century's four major challenges to incumbent presidents from members of
their own coalitions - including Edward Kennedy's run at Jimmy Carter - all resulted in the
election of a president from the opposite party.
49. See David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2073-74 (2004) (describing the role of stigma in facilitating broad-
based cuts to benefit programs); David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the
Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 829-30 (2004) (finding
that the stigmatization of benefit receipt is an important aspect of program management).
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good chance of driving an equal or greater number of swing voters into the
other party's camp. This is particularly true because of the entanglements
between race and poverty and between gender and poverty in U.S. politics.
The strong forces favoring racial humiliation defeated in the Civil Rights
Revolution did not fade away; to the contrary, they sought a new path back to
political influence. With explicit references to race likely to impose an upper
ceiling on their support, they sought alternatives with greater potential
resonance. Attacks on affirmative action (first in school busing and then in
employment and higher education admissions) served part of this purpose. So
did demands for "law and order," implicitly but deniably painting people of
color as criminals. But over time, criticism of low-income people became
perhaps the most important means of exploiting white voters' racial
antagonisms. Over the 199os, for example, the tendency of Republican
governors in the South to attack low-income people seemed to depend on their
perceived need to racialize elections; where low-income people were
predominately white, or where the Democratic candidate was African
American, welfare seemed to be far less of an issue.s
Transfer programs' infrastructure is time-consuming to build and quick to
dismantle, especially given the U.S. commitment to extensive, and
administratively demanding, conditionality. Thus, even if solid majorities
opposed to these programs take office only rarely, they can use those brief
moments to undo the work of many years of efforts to aid low-income people.
And because dismantling transfer programs poses existential challenges to
group members, advocates for low-income people are ill-equipped to take the
long view in political maneuvering.
Finally, low-income people's lack of coordination and identity has ensured
that they are relatively low on the priority lists even of their avowed supporters.
If Democratic politicians feel they cannot afford to cast too many difficult
votes, they are likely to stay the course on abortion or issues important to
organized labor while voting for a budget that pays for tax cuts with reductions
in anti-poverty programs. In the game of interest-group chicken, low-income
people are rarely even in a position to bluff.
5o. For over twenty years, the author has met regularly with a group of sophisticated anti-
poverty advocates in the Southeast. Over that time, he has noted a far greater incidence of
reports of vitriolic rhetoric about welfare in states with the largest African American
populations, except when an African American was running for statewide office as a
Democrat.
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2. Welfiire Rights in the Partisan Arena
The New Deal elevated poverty as a major national political concern for the
first time in this country's history. Initially, much of the Republican Party
opposed the New Deal categorically. This made low-income people a
seemingly natural element of the Democratic Party's core.
From the perspective of the early 196os, one could plausibly imagine low-
income people and their allies becoming a swing constituency. The Eisenhower
Administration had fully embraced the anti-poverty programs of the New Deal
while President Kennedy had been quite skittish about expanding those
programs. A welfare rights movement emerged on the fringes of the Civil
Rights Movement. Although it did not initially have a clear partisan
identification, its emphasis on rights and self-determination largely committed
it to the realm of power politics within the partisan arena.
By the end of the decade, however, President Johnson's War on Poverty
had claimed the issue for the Democrats. Even President Nixon's impressive
achievements- establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in
place of decrepit categorical programs for the elderly and people with
disabilities, starting the Section 8 housing voucher program, and expanding
food stamps nationwide-were not enough to break the association of low-
income people with the Democrats. This, too, may be the result of low-income
people's weak hold on the loyalties of their supporters, who were so alienated
by President Nixon's actions in other arenas they refused to credit his
leadership against poverty. Subsequent Republican presidents recognized the
futility and stopped trying; some instead saw political gain in attacking these
programs.
The result was power politics without the power. The welfare rights
movement and the influence that lingered after it fell apart were sufficient,
when joined with the efforts of right-wing opponents, to sink significantly
progressive welfare reform proposals made by Presidents Nixon and Carter,
but not to put anything else seriously in play. By the 198os, the concept of
welfare rights was so thoroughly reviled that President Reagan was able to
expand the sphere of partisan welfare politics (and correspondingly shrink that
of non-partisan anti-poverty policy) so that he could enact large cuts not just in
AFDC but also in in-kind programs for food, housing, and health care. By the
time "welfare reform" was back on the table in the late 198os, House
Democrats were making only the vaguest gestures toward the welfare rights
community while Republicans and Senate Democrats made none at all.
Welfare rights advocates were so dismayed by their diminished influence that
they were unable to unite behind any position, with some trying unsuccessfully
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to improve the legislation and others fruitlessly trying to revive their alliance
with the right wing to kill it.
The difficulties low-income people face in leveraging partisan politics soon
became apparent. As a few prominent Democrats turned against low-income
people and suffered no consequences, low-income people's inability to
discipline betrayals became clearer and others followed. Michael Dukakis was
the first modern governor to eliminate welfare for childless adults, a move he
touted as evidence of his centrism. That proved no barrier at all to winning the
Democratic presidential nomination, and his ultimate loss to George H.W.
Bush was widely attributed to his having moved too little, not too much,
toward the center. New Jersey Governor Jim Florio lost his re-election bid after
signing a harsh welfare bill amidst reduced turn-out in low-income areas, but
popular accounts of the race did not attribute his loss to his welfare policies.
Most strikingly, President Clinton signed the 1996 welfare law that dismantled
decades-old welfare programs and then immediately ran for re-election as the
best person to undo the damage of the law he had just approved. His vote in
low-income areas showed little if any decline from his first race.
As a bitter reward for the welfare rights community's dedication to partisan
politics, the 1996 welfare law turned out to be a petit popular constitutional
moment for the other side. With the support of virtually all Republicans and
countless prominent Democrats - including President Clinton but also about
half of congressional Democrats and all but one Democratic governor - the
legislation's core elements became effectively immune from mainstream
criticism. The primacy of states in administering welfare, the legitimacy of time
limits on aid, and the appropriateness of no-holds-barred efforts to empty out
the cash assistance rolls became incontrovertible. Even when Democrats took
full control of Congress and the White House in 2008, they made absolutely no
effort to undermine any of those principles. Henceforth, as in the aftermath of
other exercises in higher lawmaking, the debate centered on clarifying and
interpreting what had been accomplished, not questioning it. In particular,
advocates for low-income people sought to characterize the law's provisions
addressing programs other than cash assistance as being peripheral and not
included in the constitutional determination -in essence, trying to push back
the line dividing welfare and anti-poverty policy."
51. See, e.g., Super, supra note 39, at 1289-96 (arguing that food stamps are not "welfare").
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B. Constitutionalizing the Duty to Prevent Severe Hardship
Although Franklin Roosevelt, the founder of the modern Democratic Party,
gave prominent support to a new Freedom from Want, many leading
Republicans at the time voiced similar sentiments. Senator Robert Taft, the
leading conservative Republican in the years immediately after World War II,
stated as clearly as any the principle anti-poverty advocates have tried to
constitutionalize:
I believe that the American people feel that with the high production of
which we are now capable, there is enough left over to prevent extreme
hardship and maintain a minimum standard floor under subsistence,
education, medical care and housing, to give to all a minimum standard
of decent living and to all children a fair opportunity to get a start
in life."
Similarly, King v. Smith," the landmark case limiting states' ability to
manipulate public benefit program rules to humiliate low-income people,
relied heavily on findings by Eisenhower Administration officials. As noted, the
creation of SSI and Section 8 were attributable at least as much to President
Nixon as they were to any Democrats. The Food Stamp Act of 1977 was the
project of former Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern and
future Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole; Dole later called it the
most important domestic policy achievement since Social Security.
Conservative Republicans Henry Hyde and Orrin Hatch combined with liberal
Democrats Henry Waxman and Bill Bradley on a series of Medicaid expansions
in the late 198os that transformed the program from an adjunct to AFDC into a
major down payment on health insurance for all low-income people. When
President George W. Bush called for budget cuts in 2005, Georgia Republican
Saxby Chambliss, rated the fourth-most conservative member of the Senate,
flatly announced there would be no cuts to food stamps.54
More generally, the anti-poverty cause has made many of its greatest
advances when it has eschewed partisan politics and engaged established
leaders in each party to appeal to the principle of preventing severe harm.
52. U.S. RIOT COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
268 (1968).
53. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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When the well-being of low-income people has become a partisan issue, they
have been attacked by one party and taken for granted or actively shunned by
the other. Although sweeping redistribution of income remained anathema to
the Republican Party, relieving extreme distress had neither the same cost nor
the same ideological implications.
Even the setbacks anti-poverty advocates have suffered are illustrative of an
important principle of popular petit constitutionalism: the impossibility of
mixing partisan power politics with the ethical appeals of constitutionalism.
Welfare's identification with the Democratic Party, and welfare rights
advocates' exclusive residence there, gave President Reagan and Speaker
Gingrich free rein to attempt to recruit lower-middle-class white voters with
attacks on welfare. When the Democratic Party showed no interest in that
losing battle, Republicans pressed their advantage by expanding the range of
programs they were attacking. This largely marginalized Republican
supporters of food stamps, Medicaid, SSI disability benefits, and other anti-
poverty programs. Republican food stamp supporters on the agriculture
committees were conservative enough to have some room to maneuver and
thwarted their leadership's efforts to convert the program to a block grant. The
moderate Republican supporters of Medicaid and SSI, by contrast, were largely
silenced.
The impact of petit constitutionalism in anti-poverty policy is evident at
the state level, too. The most important determinant of the liberality of a state's
AFDC grant levels and Medicaid coverage has been the historic moderation of
the state's Republicans, not the strength or the attitude of its Democrats. States
such as Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania all had relatively liberal policies even though several
had lengthy Republican domination of the governor's mansion, legislature, or
both. Because welfare rights rhetoric was less prominent at the state level, the
line between partisan welfare politics and the non-partisan, petit constitutional
principle of preventing severe hardship could shift so far as to even treat AFDC
as an anti-poverty program (which, of course, it was).
CONCLUSION
Too many accounts of our public life hold that all issues not governed by a
narrow set of constitutional norms are controlled by partisan competition.
These accounts are both descriptively inaccurate and normatively unappealing.
Descriptively, these accounts leave too many important aspects of public
policy-making essentially unexplained. Legislators and executive officials of
both parties take numerous actions that are impossible to explain as self-
seeking, vote- or donation-maximizing behavior without some analytical
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sleight-of-hand that effectively assumes the conclusion. Officials spend real
political capital, and risk real consequences, from clashing with their parties or
behaving in ways that opponents could characterize as inconsistent with
constituents' interests. And even if some of this behavior is seeking to avoid
alienating moderate voters, some theory is still needed about what sorts of
demands those voters impose on issues far from their core concerns.
Normatively, two-party elections cannot effectively determine the popular
will on more than a small handful of issues. The nature of campaigns and finite
voter attention restrict how many issues meaningfully may be addressed.
Turning resolution of the remainder of the issues over to the winner is typically
the best option available. This will be likely to achieve the electorate's desired
result on issues for which preferences are well-correlated with those on which
the election was fought. Sometimes issues that lacked prominence in
campaigns have such correlation: if the voters elected a candidate vowing to
build up the army we can presume they want an adequate navy, too. On the
other hand, blithely assuming that positions on all issues correlate tightly is to
concede a degree of ideological polarization deeply antithetical to the American
political self-image. On most issues, bringing decision-making closer to those
the People elected does little to advance real democratic control.
Moreover, recognizing petit constitutional principles limits wild policy
swings as voters alternate parties for managerial rather than substantive
reasons.ss When voters perceive one party as corrupt, or find its particular
candidates untrustworthy, they may wish to turn that party out of office
temporarily. They may be reluctant to do so, however, if the consequence is
upending policies the voters long have accepted. Understanding which
principles petit constitutionalism has removed from partisan debate helps these
voters determine whether the consequences of alternating parties are
acceptable.
Groups have come to seek redress outside of partisan politics for a variety
of reasons. Some groups seeking civil rights protection have recognized that
they lacked the numbers and cohesiveness to function effectively as swing
constituencies or parts of the base of one of the major parties. Others, such as
children's advocates and people with disabilities, have felt they lacked the
cohesion to play power politics effectively. Still other vulnerable groups, such
as immigrants, prisoners, and reviled religious minorities, have such strong
55. For example, the House banking scandal that fueled the 1994 Republican wave election and
the occasional election of Democratic governors in red states to replace indicted Republicans
have not been triggered by substantive policy concerns.
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opponents that the parties may not compete aggressively for their support for
fear of driving more voters and contributors into the opposing party.
Occasionally, groups pursue their agendas through popular petit
constitutionalism when they are ejected from, or betrayed by, one of the
partisan coalitions. When California voters denied retention to Chief Justice
Rose Bird and two associate justices over their opposition to capital
punishment, the Democratic Party largely abandoned death penalty
abolitionists. When votes for relatively tepid gun legislation cost House
Judiciary Chairman Jack Brooks and some colleagues their seats in the 1994
wave election, the party walked away from gun control. Mter a backlash
against attempts to intervene in the Terry Schiavo case, the Republican Party
similarly dumped the hospice rights movement. Large elements of the
environmental movement are now having to decide whether to remain part of
the Democratic coalition or to seek to remove some of their key priorities from
partisan debate with the help of evangelicals and other conservatives who
espouse careful stewardship of the Earth."*
Although petit constitutional principles -like grand constitutional ones -
cannot directly bind the Supreme Court, they can mark particular subsequent
decisions by the Court (or by other officials) as particularly radical and hence
problematic. Plessy v. Ferguson," for example, did not just validate Jim Crow -
it also abrogated longstanding principles that held common carriers and
innkeepers to a more inclusive standard than other businesses,' which
signaled unambiguously the abandonment of Reconstruction's constitutional
legacy.
Finally, a more inclusive constitutional order can arise from recognizing
some constitutional principles, even ones of a lesser order, that are protective of
those with neither the capacity to trigger grand constitutional politics nor the
leverage to protect their interests through ordinary politics. Some groups may
not need the kind of legal sea change that requires grand constitutionalism;
others might desire such changes but still benefit from a lesser order of
protection. And without petit constitutional enforcement, too, the
achievements of grand constitutional moments are all too easy to erode after
56. See Larry Stammer, Evangelicals Advocate Earth Issues - Church Leaders Say Faith Dictates
Environment Care, Hous. CHRON., July 11, 2004, at A4 (describing initiative of some of "the
nation's most conservative Christians").
57. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
s8. See David S. Bogen, Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy, 52 VILL. L. REv. 411, 414 (2007).
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the protagonists of those struggles have receded into the shadows of public
awareness.
Reasonable people could question whether, even if a non-partisan sphere
exists outside of ordinary politics, that sphere should be described as
constitutionalism. These principles describe what We the People regard as core
values of the nation. They are set through the participation of both political
parties. They restrain the impulses of majoritarian politics. In all of these ways,
they seem to fit the label quite well. Expanding the petit constitutional canon
respects the political decisions We the People have reached in much the same
way that expanding grand constitutionalism does. Just as the American people
did not stop thinking big political thoughts in the twentieth century, they did
not walk away from second-order concerns when they restricted quartering of
soldiers in private homes in the Bill of Rights. How curious it would be if We
the People were speaking less on these matters now that the technology for
probing our views on myriad issues has reached levels the Framers could not
have imagined.
Ultimately, perhaps not a great deal turns on the label of constitutionalism.
The writings of Augustine and Aquinas, the Talmud, and the Hadiths retain
enormous influence even if they are technically part of a lesser canon. A
purported religious scholar who ignored the wisdom there would be just as
foolish as a constitutional scholar disregarding the guiding principles described
in this essay.
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